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able hearts. Over the past decade, the number of  Australia has a shortfall in donated hearts for
transplantation.
 Hearts are usually procured from brain dead donors,
but procurement from circulatory dead donors is a
potential additional source.
 However, heart transplantation after circulatory
death of the donor may not conform to the dead
donor rule.
 An amendment in law is required to permit heart
procurement for transplantation after circulatory
death.Aall donors per million population increased from
10.0 in 20051 to 16.1 in 2014.2 However, the number of
heart donations per million population over the same
period has declined slightly from 3.8 to 3.4, with an
annual average of 3.3.3 Procurement of organs has always
been conducted according to the dead donor rule— that
is, after death of the donor — but this practice is being
challenged.
The lawdefines death in allAustralian jurisdictions (eg, in
s 41 of the Human Tissue Act 1982 [Vic]) as either “irre-
versible cessation of all functions of the brain” (brain
death) or as “irreversible cessation of circulation of blood
in the body” (circulatory death), but it does not define
irreversible or how to determine irreversibility (Box).
Exceptionally, circulatory death is not defined inWestern
Australian legislation.
Although the procurement of organs such as livers,
kidneys and lungs is permitted after either brain death
or circulatory death according to Acts in all jurisdic-
tions, the procurement of hearts has traditionally only
been from brain dead donors with functioning hearts.
The definition and diagnosis of brain death is not
without controversy4,5 and may explain in part why
more reliance is being placed on circulatory death,
which reduces availability of hearts.6,7 Alternatively,
organ procurement from patients after circulatory death
may be perceived as more realisable than after brain
death. Indeed, circulatory death as the source of solid
organs has increased from 10% of 204 donors in 2005 to
28% of 378 donors in 2014.1,2 More total organs have
been procured (from 726 to 1193) but the number of
hearts has increased only slightly from 72 of 204 donors
(35%) to 79 of 378 donors (21%) over the same
period.1,2 Only 39 hearts were procured from 189 do-
nors (21%) during the first 6 months of 2015.8Organ donation and procurement after
circulatory death
In the practice of organ donation after circulatory death
(DCD), life-sustaining treatment such as mechanical
ventilation is commonly withdrawn because of a
devastating neurological injury that has not progressed
to brain death. The withdrawal of treatment from the
donor is staged to facilitate organ transplantation to re-
cipients. The procurement of organs is specified in the
Australian national DCD protocol published by the Or-
gan and Tissue Authority9 and enacted through the
DonateLife network. It is not declared why the heart isMJA 203 (6) j 21 September 2015not included in the protocol’s list of organs that may be
procured.
Expeditious organ procurementmay be commenced after
deathhas occurred—defined inAustralia as 2e5minutes
after cessation of the donor’s circulation,9 and after 2
minutes inUnited States.10 The donor’s arrested heart has
not usually been procured. However, to increase the
availability of hearts, routine procurement after circula-
tory death is proposed but not yet sanctioned in the cur-
rent national DCD protocol.9 It is probable that the
protocol is under review given that the Organ and Tissue
Authority lauded St Vincent’s Hospital in Sydney, where
two adults were transplanted with hearts procured after
circulatory death in 2014.11 In those cases, the donor
hearts were reanimated and kept beating and warm
inside a container (ex-vivo Organ Care System, Trans-
Medics) pending transplantation.12
This practice poses ethical,13 legal and medical prob-
lems. Foremost of the medical difficulties is the poor
condition of the procured heart after it has ceased to
circulate blood in the donor. However, the heart can be
resuscitated with the aid of extracorporeal techniques,
as was performed for the two adult recipients at
St Vincent’s Hospital.11,12
Heart transplantations after cardiac death have been
performed in three infants in North America14 but were
followed by consternation and a medical call for a mora-
torium on all organ procurement after cardiac death and
the accusation that doctors and hospitals were biased
towards organ procurement.15 The basis for the opposi-
tion was that the infants may not have been dead and
possibly were conscious at the time of organ procure-
ment. Of the three infants, one was declared dead 3
minutes after cessation of cardiocirculatory function
before the process of organ procurement was initiated,
and two were declared dead after 75 seconds.14
Australian statute law governing procurement of
organs for transplantation
Jurisdiction Act Provision
NSW Human Tissue Act 1983 s 33
Qld Transplantation and
Anatomy Act 1979
s 45(1)
SA Transplantation and
Anatomy Act 1983
s 24(2)
Death (Definition) Act 1983 s 2
Tas Human Tissue Act 1985 s 27A
Vic Human Tissue Act 1982 s 41
WA Human Tissue and
Transplant Act 1982*
s 24(2)
ACT Transplantation and
Anatomy Act 1978
s 45
NT Transplantation and
Anatomy Act 2014
s 23
*Note: circulatory death is not defined in Western Australian
legislation.u
Ethics and lawMedical interpretation of the legal
definition of death
The source of the problem of heart transplantation after
circulatory death is the medical interpretation of the legal
definition of circulatory death. From a medical point of
view, in other contexts, death is not necessarily definedby
cessation of the circulation, unless it is of sufficient dura-
tion to result in brain death. It is not rare, for example, to
be able to resuscitate a victim from a short duration car-
diac arrest with complete neurological recovery or to
sustain the circulation of a patient for lengthy periods by
an extracorporeal circulation with subsequent intrinsic
cardiac recovery.
The fact that a transplanted heart can function and sustain
life in a recipient must mean that the circulation of the
donor is never ceased irreversibly and therefore that the
donor of the heart is never dead until his or her heart is
removed.
The question is thus posed— how is it possible to procure
theheart of adonorunder thepremise of circulatorydeath
and yet expect it to sustain life in a recipient? Put differ-
ently, should the procurement of the heart be a criminal
offence in such cases, because its procurement is the cause
of death of the donor?
A possible argument to justify heart procurement for
transplantation after circulatory death is that legal irre-
versible cessation of the circulation may be interpreted
medically as “will not be resuscitated” rather than
“cannot be resuscitated”. However, that interpretation
does not appear to be open to the medical profession.
From a legal point of view, the meaning of legislation is
governed by statute law. In the jurisdiction considered
here, it is the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) andActs Interpretation Act 1901 (Cwlth) that apply, but these
are not helpful in defining “irreversible”.
If a word or phrase is not defined in anAct, resort is made
to common law interpretations, which may be described
as literal or purposive. The literal interpretation of legis-
lationwas defined by JusticeHiggins in theHighCourt of
Australia as:
The fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all
others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be
expounded according to the intent of the Parliament
that made it; and that intention has to be found by
an examination of the language used in the statute
as a whole. The question is, what does the language
mean; and when we find what the language means,
in its ordinary and natural sense, it is our duty to
obey that meaning, even if we think the result
would be inconvenient or impolitic or improbable.16
The literal approach may be too restrictive if a word or
phrase has more than one meaning. In such instances,
legal resort is made to a reputable dictionary — in
Australia, usually the Macquarie Dictionary. Since that
dictionary defines “irreversible” as “not reversible; that
cannot be reversed”, a legal and hence medical interpre-
tation of irreversible cannot logically be “will not be
resuscitated”. Doctors cannot simply redefine the mean-
ing of words in legislation to suit their practice.
Notwithstanding that the natural and ordinarymeanings
of words are the starting points in interpreting Acts,17 a
purposive interpretation may be considered when a
literal approach produces ambiguity or inconsistency
(Acts Interpretation Act, s 15AA). Such an interpretation
would be one that best achieves the purpose or object of
the Act, whether expressly stated or derived from the
content of the Act.
In Victoria, the stated aim of the Human Tissue Act is to
make provision for removal of human tissue for trans-
plantation and, among other aims, to provide a definition
ofdeath. Thepurpose of definingdeath is notdeclaredbut
s 26 of the Act allows a designated officer and medical
officers to remove tissue for transplantation only when
the proposed organ donor has fulfilled the definition of
death under s 41. In otherwords, a purpose of theAct is to
prevent tissue and organ procurement from a donor who
is not dead. Thus, heart procurement for transplantation
under the practice of DCD is not possible under either a
literal or purposive interpretation of the Act.
A similar problem with the interpretation of legislation
has occurred in the United States, where death is defined
in the Uniform Determination of Death Act 1982, on
which Australian legislation has been modelled. The US
Act also defines circulatory death as “irreversible cessa-
tion of circulatory and respiratory functions”. In a pur-
posive approach, Bernat18 has proposed that as doctors
diagnose death by permanent cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions, this satisfies the requirements of
death statutes and does not violate the dead donor
rule. Bernat also proposes that “permanence is a perfect
surrogate indicator for irreversibility” and thus permitsMJA 203 (6) j 21 September 2015 269
270
Ethics and lawheart donation after DCD. This argument is similarly not
sustainable. The Macquarie Dictionary defines “perma-
nent” as “lasting or intended to last indefinitely; remain-
ing unchanged; not temporary; enduring; abiding”.
Clearly, a heart that has ceased functioning in adonor and
functions later in a recipient has not ceased functioning
irreversibly or permanently. Moreover, permanent
cessation of the circulation is not the legal definition of
death, and the concept, wrong that it is, is similarly not
available to doctors to justify heart transplantation after
circulatory death.
Another putative justification for heart procurement after
DCD is that, whereas the heart may have stopped irre-
versibly in the donor’s body, it is able to function in that of
the recipient. This is also a spurious argument, because
the only reason that the heart stops in the donor is the
elective, and hence reversible, withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment such as mechanical ventilation.
The heart had obviously been functioning well in the
donor’s body before its procurement.
Possible solution
This potential problem of heart procurement being the
cause of the donor’s death arises because death has been
mistakenly defined in the legal sense as cessation of the
circulation, without any reference to brain function. A
possible alternative would be to retain the present defi-
nition of brain death as irreversible cessation of all func-
tion of the brain, but to omit the requirement for
irreversibility in the definition of circulatory death and to
redefine it as cessation of circulatory function with
cessation of higher brain function. Under this propositionMJA 203 (6) j 21 September 2015for the redefinition of circulatory death for the purpose
of transplantation, procurement of a heart for the pur-
pose of its transplantation could proceed without legal
risk and without risk of retained consciousness of the
donor.
Conclusion
Organ transplantation is ethical whether after brain death
or circulatory death, and it is proper to maximise organ
procurement, but only as permitted by law. We have
shown that heart transplantation after DCD does not
conform to present statute law. When the way forward is
not clear in a medicolegal conundrum such as this one,
legislation needs to be refined. Otherwise, as some legal
academics have argued,19 procurement of a heart after
cardiac death for transplantation under present legisla-
tion does not conform to the dead donor rule. Thismay be
a potential criminal offence, an accusation that may need
to be made in order to encourage law reform. Alterna-
tively, the dead donor rule, which would arguably be
violated in heart transplantation after circulatory death,
needs societal, legal and medical debate followed by
revision or abandonment.13 Otherwise, Australia’s
improving organ donor program is at risk of adverse
publicity and damage if doctors, hospitals and our organ
procurement agencies are perceived as procuring organs
from patients not legally dead.
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